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This article analyzes the Ottoman famines of the 1870s – that killed tens of 
thousands of people in Anatolia due to starvation and disease – from a global 
comparative perspective. It focuses on two famines in particular that struck the 
central and eastern provinces of the empire in 1873-75 and 1879-1881 (just 
following the Russo-Ottoman War of 1877-78), respectively. They were triggered 
by climatic causes, yet their devastating effects were also a product of the global 
and domestic economic and political environment of the decade. Local, imperial 
and global man-made reasons exacerbated the severe impacts of nature and 
climate. The article addresses these famines as significant traumatic disasters, the 
memories of which were overshadowed by later catastrophic events in Ottoman 
history and historiography, and which have been almost invisible in European and 
global famine historiography of the nineteenth century. It summarizes the political-
economic environment of the decade, attempts to investigate Ottoman famines in a 
global historical context and outline a comparative research agenda for an Ottoman 
history of famine and empire in the late nineteenth century.
(…)I have found, in many places, many persons who did not so much as know that 
there was a famine in Asia Minor, who had no knowledge of it before, who were not 
aware that a struggle against death from starvation had been going on in Asia Minor 
for the last twenty months, and that the whole population of that country had been 
decimated, enfeebled by disease, and so scattered and dispersed, that the whole of its 
social system had been utterly disorganized.1
* This article has been prepared at the Center for Middle Eastern Studies (CMES) at Harvard 
University during the post-doc fellowship term (2015–2016), funded by TUBITAK (The Scientific 
and Technological Research Council of Turkey) 2219 Program. I would like to thank editor Andrew 
G. Newby and the reviewers for their significant critique and inputs on the article, and Seçil Yılmaz, 
Michael Raskin, Paula Garbarino and Fatih Artvinli for their invaluable support, feedback and 
comments. This article is derived from my doctoral dissertation completed at the European University 
Institute (EUI) in Florence (2012). I dedicate it to my supervisor Professor Anthony Molho to whom I 
am indebted for teaching me the significance of scales and trans-communal, trans-national, world-
historical perspectives. 
1 Whitaker, 1875, 15–6. See Ertem, 2015, 17–27 for a critical analysis of the meeting report. 
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Edgar Whitaker, the British proprietor and editor of the Istanbul-based English-
French language newspaper Levant Herald, addressed the crowd composed of 
British and several other European businessmen, diplomats, statesmen and 
merchants at Willis’s Rooms in London with the above sentences on June 24, 
1875. It was the meeting of the Asia Minor Famine Relief Fund established with 
the purpose of collecting relief subscriptions from the British public for the starving 
population in the central Anatolian provinces of the Ottoman Empire. The members 
of the auxiliary committee seemed to listen with the self-confidence and pride of 
just having “saved” the starving Indians from the pangs of hunger during the famine 
in Bihar and Bengal in 1873-74.2 Then was the turn of the starving Ottomans. One 
year earlier, in May 1874, A.A. Low, a prominent member and the previous president 
of the New York Chamber of Commerce, had responded to a toast for commerce 
at the annual dinner of the organization in New York, saying that commerce’s virtue 
lay in its ability to bring human societies together. “From populous provinces of 
India and from Asia Minor, wo[e]ful tales are brought us of wide-spread famine,” he 
stated; yet it was by “virtue of commerce” that the people of those countries were 
being saved from starvation. He had praised the railways, and electric wires which 
permitted “neither land nor water, however lofty or deep, to arrest the work that 
makes of one great family all the nations of the earth.”3
Railways and electric wires did not always necessarily save people and relieve 
suffering as claimed by the British and American merchants, businessmen and 
administrators at the time. As Mike Davis has discussed thoroughly, throughout 
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, they were used also for exactly opposite 
interests or the interests of a privileged few as well.4 Yet, the same technology has 
also generated historical evidence about the connected elements of modern human 
experiences of people living within a “coeval modernity.”5 Famines in different 
parts of the world in the nineteenth century have been significant events mutually 
shaping this modernity, and thus they offer us insights into diverse interrelated 
imperial hi(stories) of the modern world.
This article analyzes the Ottoman famines of the 1870s that killed tens of 
thousands of people in Anatolia due to starvation and disease, from a global 
2 Unlike the catastrophic death of millions during the next famine in India in 1876–79 under strict 
British laissez-faire policies—which had not occurred yet by the time of the above mentioned 
meeting—the efficient famine intervention policies of the colonial British administration during the 
previous famine in Bihar and Bengal in 1873–74 had proved successful. Davis, 2000, 36.
3 New York Times, 8 May 1874.
4 The same means would soon be used for exporting grain from India to London while millions in 
India were dying of hunger. Asian and African perception(s) of “imperial glory” were different from 
those of the British colonial masters. Davis, 2001, 7. Not just food and welfare—and not always to 
the appropriate  destination— but also guns and violence have been transported and disseminated 
through these networks. 
5 Harry D. Harootunian, a prominent historian of inter-war Japan, describes “coeval modernity” as 
shared by global actors in the same temporality against linear understandings of modernization that 
scaled and measured countries based on their levels of development and progress in that linearity. 
See Harootunian, 2002. 
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comparative perspective. It focuses on two famines in particular that struck the 
central and eastern provinces of the empire in 1873-75 and 1879-1881 (just 
following the Russo-Ottoman War of 1877-78), respectively.6 They were triggered 
by climatic causes, yet their devastating effects were also a product of the global 
and domestic economic and political environment of the decade. Local, imperial 
and global man-made reasons combined with the heavy impacts of nature and 
climate. The article addresses these famines as significant traumatic disasters, 
whose memories were overshadowed by later catastrophic events in Ottoman 
history and historiography, and which have been almost invisible in European and 
global famine historiography of the nineteenth century. It summarizes the political-
economic environment of the decade, attempts to investigate Ottoman famines 
in a global historical context and outline a comparative research agenda for an 
Ottoman history of famine and empire in the late nineteenth century. 
The 1870s: Famine and Empire in Dire Straits
While European and global famine historiography were not interested in Ottoman 
famines of the nineteenth century, the historiography of the Ottoman Empire 
in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries has, for the most part, told 
either variations of an elite-bureaucrat-led modernization story, or rising religious/
ethnic tensions, wars, decline and dissolution. The few studies on famines in 
Ottoman historiography made significant contributions in Turkish, especially by 
drawing attention to rich archival materials.7 However, they also treated the topic 
usually from the perspective of state institution(s), employing solely logistical and 
administrative-chronological approaches. Due to the emphasis put on Ottoman 
successes, and the paucity of historical sources on ordinary people’s voices, the 
political-ideological dimensions of the famines, and local perspectives were mostly 
overlooked. There is still a lot of room for research on the political, environmental, 
social, cultural, and psychological dimensions of the famines. Today, however, 
encouraged by the emerging field of Ottoman environmental history, future studies 
on the comparative socio-cultural and political impact of famines can find a more 
solid background.8
6 According to contemporary records, in the first famine no fewer than 100,000 people, and in the 
second famine no fewer than 10,000 people, lost their lives. 
7 Among these studies, the only monograph in Turkish on famines in the nineteenth century is 
Erler, 2010. For a general bibliography on the subject, see Ertem, 2012a.  
8 Mikhail, 2011; White, 2011; Ayalon, 2015; Dursun, 2007); Tanielian, 2012; Gratien, 2015; Pitts, 
2016; Pehlivan, 2016. For the recent situation of the field of Ottoman environmental history, see 
Mikhail, 2012. Recently, Zafer Karademir made an important contribution to early modern Ottoman 
famine history with his work  on famines of  the 16th and 17th centuries. See Karademir, 2014). See 
also Ottoman History Podcast (OHP), ‘Silent violence in the late Ottoman period’, Özge Ertem, 
Graham Pitts and Chris Gratien <http://www.ottomanhistorypodcast.com/2014/08/famine-ottoman-
empire-lebanon-anatolia.html> (visited 8 Jan. 2014). 
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Famines in the Ottoman Empire are smaller scale famines, compared with the 
other great famines of the nineteenth century, but the intensity of their impacts on 
the daily life of local populations was similar. Both famines in central and eastern 
provinces were triggered by harsh droughts followed by extremely cold winter 
conditions. Yet, the general environment of political and economic crisis of that 
decade played a crucial role.9 Class mattered extensively, and although there was 
general impoverishment across all classes, religions, and sects during the famines, 
local merchants and grain-holders in particular localities profited from the situation. 
Usually, poor peasants and townspeople paid the highest price.
The central Anatolian famine started with the drought in the summer of 1873. 
Following the exhaustion of all supplies—including the grain saved as seed after 
the 1873 round of taxation —during the extremely cold winter of 1874-75, the 
disaster reached intolerable levels in isolated villages. The center was the province 
of Angora [Ankara] but it effected a region covering an area of about 40,000 square 
miles.10 In his tour in the region, Cesarea [Kayseri] station missionary Wilson 
Farnsworth observed that in the whole district, the inhabitants had fled searching 
for food, and leaving behind their starved.Their flocks and herds had perished, 
their fields and vineyards were ruined and they had burned their own houses for 
fuel, he observed.11 The collection of the autumn tax in 1873, which had occurred 
despite previous warnings from locals about the expected bad harvest, had left the 
peasants with few resources when winter arrived.12 In Ankara and Konya, due to 
contemporary records, 40 per cent of all herds died, and each and every community, 
especially the poor Turks, Greeks, Armenians, and Jews were effected. Around 
100,000 people alone died because of diseases related to hunger.13 Once winter 
was over and roads were opened, villagers had no choice but walk for hours at first 
to neighbouring villages. However, the neighbouring villages were as devastated 
as theirs. Then they started walking to cities without any calories to subsist them. 
Many people died on the road. Roads, towns, and cities as far afield as Istanbul filled 
with famine refugees. British businessmen, merchants, journalists, and Protestant 
American missionaries each established separate relief commissions both in 
Istanbul and the Anatolian provinces. The Ottoman government also established 
its own commission.14 However, most people seem to have died during the winter 
and early spring of 1874, before there was any awareness of the true magnitude 
of the disaster, and any official efficient relief organization corresponding to it.The 
9 In his classical work, Roderic H. Davison calls the years 1871-5 a “period of chaos.” Davison, 
1963, 301–5.
10 Farnsworth, 1904, 56.
11 Levant Herald, 29 Jul. 1874 (in The Famine in Asia Minor, 1989, 56).
12 Ottoman state’s taxation practices in the provinces did not exclude the use of force as Nadir 
Özbek has shown. Özbek, 2009.
13 Naumann, 1893 (in Kuniholm, 1990).
14 Erler has written in detail in Turkish about the Ottoman government’s and local officials’ famine 
relief initiatives, committees, and actions. Erler, 2010, 193–202. 
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total number of casualties of starvation, hunger, and disease was estimated to be 
around 100,000-150,000.15 
Ottoman Provisioning Policies
In order to discuss the continuities and discontinuities in official famine relief 
policies in the 1870s, one needs to remember earlier provisioning policies. The 
administrative measures the Ottoman government took against earlier famines 
were in keeping with the provisionist legal and moral tradition that survived until 
the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century, which required the state intervene 
to control prices in each phase of the production, trade, transportation, and 
distribution of grains. The rationale behind regulatory policies of provisioning, as 
Seven Ağır underlined, was “redistribution of grain in order to ensure an affordable 
and abundant supply in the cities”. Price controls such as price ceilings (narh) 
were “justified by a rhetoric of welfare, that identified public good with ensuring the 
subsistence of all.”16 Rhoads Murphey summarized the pattern of  early modern 
15 Naumann, 1893 (in Kuniholm, 1990); Quataert, 1968. 
16 Ağır, 2009, 202.  
Figure 1. The Ottoman Empire at the beginning of the 20th century (the provinces of 
Hidjaz, Yemen and Western Tripoli are not shown). Map courtesy of the Houshamadyan 
Association. Accessed 1 Mar. 2017 via http://www.houshamadyan.org/en/mapottomanempire.html
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Ottoman measures in response to crop failures in the following manner: “[...] partial 
rebates or full waivers of taxes [while] in times of prosperity it sought to compensate 
for temporary and local shortages by enforcement of resource sharing between 
better-off and less fortunate districts.”17 In her Ph.D. dissertation, Ağır argued 
convincingly that increasing international competition, political, and financial losses 
in wars and the narrowing of the grain supply zone in the Ottoman Empire in the late 
eighteenth century paved the way for “a shift of focus in political economy… away 
from a moral ideology that emphasized welfare and justice towards an ideology that 
emphasized wealth and development in the grain sector.”18 While the establishment 
of a central Grain Administration [Zahire Nezareti] in Istanbul in 1793 may give 
one the impression that grain provisioning for the capital city was becoming more 
centralized, regularized, and protectionist, the centralizing attempt in fact, took place 
simultaneously with “a more flexible attitude towards price controls.”19The Grain 
Administration was abolished in 1839. Bilateral free trade agreements between the 
Ottoman Empire and foreign powers in 1838-41 led to a further loosening of state 
control over the grain trade. Bilateral commercial agreements upheld the principle 
of free trade in relation to the major European powers, beginning with the Anglo-
British Treaty of 1838. Thus, they led to the end of state monopolies in trade and 
provided easy, open access to Ottoman markets for British merchants.20 At the 
same time, local merchants were still bound by rules that limited their mobility in 
trade transactions. Eventually, along with the abolishment of the internal custom 
dues on local trade in 1874, prospects for local merchants engaged in grain in 
Anatolian towns improved. Grain merchants began to act relatively more flexibly 
once freed from state control on their mobility.
Despite these relaxations, due to the absence of railways until the late 1880s 
and the uneven commercialization of agriculture in the Anatolian provinces, a 
small number of local notable families continued to dominate grain trade in several 
towns. Grain hoarding and consequent class conflicts deepened in the countryside 
during both famines, yet the former’s impact remained local and regional.21 Only 
after the 1890s did the once famine-stricken regions of central Anatolia become 
the breadbaskets of the capital city. Unlike the relationship between India and 
London, before 1890, the amount of Anatolian grain consumed in Istanbul was low; 
it amounted to only 2 per cent of all Anatolian grain in 1889.22 Thus, while London 
consumed Indian grain during the famine in India, it was not Anatolian grain that 
17 Murphey, 1988, 218. 
18 Ağır, 2009, 203; Güran, 1984–5, 27-41.
19 Ağır, 2009, 117. See also Salzmann, 1993.
20 See Kütükoğlu, 1976. 
21 Local perceptions of corruption, tyranny, justice and moral economy could transform into 
significant expressions and actions of discontent and resistance to grain hoarders and state officials. 
For an excellent example of  local points of view on state intervention  and local perceptions of 
justice in an Ottoman Balkan province in the 1840s, see Kırlı, 2015. 
22 Quataert, 1993.
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fed the imperial center in Istanbul. As Pamuk noted, only after the establishment 
of the Anatolian railroad that linked Eskişehir, Konya and Ankara to Istanbul, “as 
many as 400.000 tons of cereals were being shipped annually on the railroad” in 
the 1890s.23
One cannot discern a clear-cut departure from a provisionist ‘ancien-regime’ 
in state famine relief of the late nineteenth century. As Mehmet Genç underlines, 
long-established provisionist practices and customs were not abandoned wholly 
in the provisioning of food and basic requirements for subsistence.24 The relief 
policies the Ottoman government implemented to address agricultural distress and 
famine in 1873-75 still included some of the older measures, such as strict bans 
on exports and black-marketing. During both famines, the state organized relief 
initiatives, loosened its taxation policies and ordered tax remissions for particular 
periods of time until peasants could get better yields from the fields in 1875 and in 
1881, respectively. They were temporary solutions. Sometimes the policy brought 
short-term relief; usually, however, it was not sufficient and daily survival of the poor 
was still at stake. The outcomes and influences of these policies were neither even 
nor coherent, but varied due to local circumstances, the role of local intermediaries 
in their implementation, the hegemony of grain-holders in a region and the financial 
and political strains that the country faced at the time. The sources of those strains 
were both local and global. Climate, socio-spatial geographies of vulnerability, 
regional political-economic dynamics, political inaction and infrastructural problems 
combined with the international political-economic context that imposed its harsh 
conditions on the Ottoman government. The droughts transformed to catastrophes 
within this context. The Ottoman polity was an actor in the world of modern 
empires, and the quiet famines in isolated villages in Ottoman Anatolia in 1870s 
were strongly related to the developments in the world around them in the same 
temporality. During the famines, the non-colonial Ottoman imperial realm—with all 
its particularities intact—shared a lot with both the “colonizers” and the “colonized” 
of the nineteenth century, despite being technically neither.25
23 Pamuk, 1987, 104.  
24 Genç, 2000; Yıldırım, 2002. 
25 In his article (Gölbaşı, 2011), Edip Gölbaşı demonstrates the problems of overemphasizing 
the ‘colonialism debate’ in the Ottoman context and instead focuses on modern state practices, 
elements of social control, and Ottoman understandings of citizenship to define and discuss the 
particularities of Ottoman imperialism in the nineteenth century. Regarding Ottoman particularities, 
Thomas Kuhn’s study (Kuhn, 2007) of Ottoman policies in Yemenin the late nineteenth century 
suggests that “in marked contrast to the example of Britain, Ottoman politics of difference were not 
meant to separate those who came under the purview of an official nationalism from those who did 
not.” Therefore, in a political-institutional sense, the Ottomans did not establish their policies on the 
basis of “colonial difference,” but on political “negotiation” and “integration” because of their own 
survival needs. 
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Politics and Economy – 
Context, Comparison and Historiography
Until the publication of a special section of the journal Comparative Studies of 
South Asia, Africa and the Middle East in 2007, analysis of the British and Ottoman 
Empires within the same historical and analytical framework had been confined 
to studies of the early modern era.26 The articles in the volume were significant 
contributions to the historiography of empires in the nineteenth century. They 
helped interrogate the historiographical problems embedded in the perception 
that “the two empires [British and Ottoman] inhabited what were for all intents and 
purposes quite different realms of temporality.”27 Khoury and Kennedy underline 
that the above conviction, which had its origins in European works of the nineteenth 
century and earlier, functioned to make a distinction between “progressive, liberal 
and modern” states and societies vis-a-vis the “static, oppressive, and archaic” 
ones. The articles in the above-mentioned volume challenged these assumptions 
and pointed to the need of putting the two empires into the same analytical 
framework of comparison: 
Both empires ruled vast territories that were inhabited by peoples of widely different 
faith, customs, ethnicities, and more; both made accomodations to these differences 
even as they sought to erase them; both advanced a universalizing mission while 
acknowledging its limits; both asserted authoritarian powers and conceded local 
autonomy.28
However, the emphasis Peter Gray places on Ireland’s and India’s differences 
in order to escape from “crude analytical models” of colonialism is valid for the 
Ottoman context as well.29 In a similar vein, in their quest to historicize studies in 
Ottoman history that have used comparison as a tool since the 1990s, Alan Mikhail 
and Christine Phillou underline that the particularities of the Ottoman Empire 
should not be overlooked for comparison’s sake. Instead, referring to Sanjay 
Subrahmanyam’s useful concept, they suggest doing “connected histories” which 
preserve the specifities of each historical experience while showing the connections 
and “struggle, tension, mutuality and contestation” in the space “between”:
The Ottoman Empire was an elaborate and changing power formation where the 
structures and mentalities of empire met more abstract ideologies of early modern 
26 Khoury and Kennedy, 2007. For a significant analysis of literature on comparative political 
history of the early modern Ottoman Empire, see Salzmann, 1998. The ‘Mediterranean’ became 
also a prominent category of analysis for the early modern Ottoman world thanks to the notable 
work by the Ottoman historian, Faruk Tabak (Tabak, 2008). For the early history of the Ottomans 
within “the larger story of medieval Asia Minor,” thus in the history of the broader world surrounding 
them and having a counterpart in the Iberian peninsula, see Kafadar, 1995.
27 Khoury and Kennedy, 2007, 234.
28 Khoury and Kennedy, 2007, 234.
29 Gray, 2006, 193. 
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sovereignty, then nationalism and the exigencies of imperial rivalry, and then colonialist 
contestation. It is in the interaction among all of these forces that the dynamism of this 
empire takes center stage.30
The decade of the 1870s was one of the most difficult periods for both the 
Ottoman state and its subjects, making evident the interplay and contestation of 
such forces both in the global and in the local arenas. The two famines took place 
at a time of  Ottoman preoccupation with the survival of empire / state in a decade 
of imperialist rivalry and internal economic and political turmoil. In 1876, following 
the fiscal bankruptcy of the Ottoman state, social and political uprisings in Bosnia 
and Bulgaria, and consequent protests of Muslim religious school (medrese) 
students in Istanbul, Sultan Abdülaziz was dethroned by a pro-constitutional and 
pro-parliamentary government faction. It was only a year after the agricultural yields 
in central Anatolia had started to improve and the previous famine disaster was 
on its way out. The opposition promoted liberal and Islamic patriotic discourses 
denouncing the financial and political weaknesses of the state, and the increasing 
financial and political intervention of foreign powers in the affairs of the Empire by 
way of the turmoil in the Balkans. After Abdülaziz, Murad V ascended the throne 
for only three months until being replaced by Sultan Abdülhamid II. The latter was 
enthroned by the liberal faction in 1876, on the condition that he would order the 
promulgation of the first Ottoman constitution and opening of a parliament. The 
constitution was promulgated the same year, and parliament was opened in 1877. 
However, Sultan Abdülhamid II dissolved it once the Russo-Ottoman War of 1877-
78 started.31 Subsequently, he would rule the country without a parliament for more 
than thirty years.
Looking at the Ottoman state under Sultan Abdülhamid II’s rule (1876-1909) in 
the context of world changes, and taking issue with those perspectives which either 
orientalized the empire as the “Terrible Turk” and “Oriental Despot” or glorified it, 
Selim Deringil, a noteable historian of the late Ottoman Empire and Abdülhamid 
era, defines the period with the legitimacy crisis of the Ottoman state. Since the 
last quarter of the eighteenth century, likewise their contemporaries in Europe, the 
Ottoman rulers and administrators had developed reforms and policies aimed at 
political, fiscal, judicial, and military centralization of the Ottoman state. In 1839, the 
Tanzimat-ı Hayriye or the Gülhane Reform Edict set the stage for the establishment 
of a modern state apparatus in the Ottoman Empire. The Edict prepared by the 
Minister of Foreign affairs Mustafa Reşid Pasha in 1839, promised reform in four 
main areas: it guaranteed the lives, honour and property of all Ottoman subjects, 
and promised the equality of all subjects before the law, thereby introducing an 
egalitarian concept of “Ottoman” citizenship. In addition, it promised a centralized 
and rationalized military conscription system as well as the establishment of a 
30 Mikhail & Phillou, 2012, 743–4. 
31 Somel, 2003, lx–Ixi. 
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new, centralized tax system to replace the old system of tax-farming.32As Deringil 
stated, the modern state with its “mass schooling, a postal service, railways, 
lighthouses, clock towers, lifeboats, museums, censuses, and birth certificates, 
passports, as well as parliaments, bureaucracies, and armies was only constituted 
in the Ottoman Empire after the Reform Edict of 1839.”33 These developments all 
paved the way for an intense bureaucratization and centralization of the state in 
the Ottoman lands. Indeed, the Ottoman Empire shared the same ambitions as 
other empires in seeking centralized political, administrative, military power, state 
fiscality and economic growth; the “inseparable features of nineteenth century 
historical environments.”34
After the Crimean War (1853-56), the challenges brought by global change on 
both the rulers and the ruled became even more tangible:
[…]just as the state was permeating levels of society it had never reached before, making 
unprecedented demands on its people, it created new strains on society, leading to what 
Jurgen Habermas has called a “legitimacy crisis” or “legitimation deficit.” Nor was this 
legitimacy crisis confined to the relationship of the Ottoman center with its own society. 
In the international arena also, the Ottomans found themselves increasingly obliged to 
assert and reassert their legitimate right to existence as a recognized member of the 
Concert of Europe, as recognized after the Treaty of Paris which ended the Crimean 
War in 1856.35
The legitimacy crisis in question was situated both in the political/ideological and 
the economic realm/sphere. The American Board of Commissioners for Foreign 
Missions (ABCFM) Protestant missionary accounts, reports, correspondences, 
diaries, and the British consulate archives have been some of the most crucial 
sources showing the political implications of the crisis during the famines in 
Ottoman Anatolia.36 These global actors provided famine relief to thousands of 
Turkish, Armenian, Kurdish, Greek, Jewish, Syriac, Nestorian, Arab, and Chaldean 
communities in central and eastern provinces. During the famine years, the ABCFM 
missionaries and the British consuls stationed in Asia Minor tried to fill the void 
left by the Ottoman state in many provinces by way of relief networks, which in 
many instances became influential. They helped save thousands from starvation 
in central and eastern provinces and Mosul. Yet, in addition to humanitarian 
purposes, the missions had their own religious and political agendas. In accounting 
for  both famines, they produced discourses about the Ottoman Empire that were 
embedded in particular ideologies and regimes of government. The missionaries 
32 Zürcher, 2002, 7. In 1842, the old system of tax-farming was reapplied due to the difficulties of 
maintaining the system of centralized tax-collection. 
33 Deringil, 1999, 9–10.
34 İslamoğlu & Purdue, 2009, 112. 
35 Deringil, 1999, 9–10. 
36 Ertem, 2012b.
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laid stronger emphasis on the decay of “Mohammedanism” and “Islam”, whereas 
British relief agents pointed to corruption and the lack of railways, reform, laissez-
faire economics, and overall faith in trade and science. Individual accounts written 
by missionaries and consuls were  much more nuanced and complex, yet, as 
institutional representatives, they had the motive of increasing their religious 
and political influence in Asia Minor by claims on moral, political, economic, and 
religious superiority.
The British and foreign language press also took the famines as occasions to 
condemn the Ottoman Empire for being a “corrupt despotism,” a backward polity 
with bad government. In Istanbul, Edgar Whitaker’s Levant Herald blamed the 
local Ottoman authorities for “entirely ignoring the inexorable laws of supply and 
demand,” by forcing “the importers to sell their grain at unremunerative rates.” The 
paper went on to state: “The laws of economy triumphed, the door was opened 
to famine, and starvation stalked in.”37British actors continued to underline the 
“corruption” of the Ottoman government and its misrule as the real cause of the 
famine. Likewise, the Shaghai-based North China Herald condemned the Chinese 
government’s intervention in the “natural laws of supply and demand,” during the 
Chinese famine (1876-79).38A decade earlier, the London-based British press had 
used similar discourses to “humiliate the Russian Empire” and condemn “Russian 
rule and indifference” during the Finnish Famine in the 1860s: “The Finns were 
presented as a people who had endured ‘the most cruel sufferings in the defence 
of national independence’ during the Russian-Swedish war of 1808-9, a people 
for whom the ‘burden’ of Russian rule was ‘too heavy to be any longer endured.’”39 
Such publications and official voices identified Ottomans, Chinese, Russians and 
Indians pretty much by the same words. 
Not surprisingly, the British short-term and long-term policies regarding famine 
and government in India were considered in British accounts to be the best 
example of government. They saw laissez-faire economies and free trade to be 
the real, modern path to development and reform in the famine-stricken regions 
of Asia Minor, in accordance with British policies in India. They advised the same 
path  for China. This belief also served their own political interests: famine relief 
and charity gave the British consuls and the American Protestant missionaries the 
grounds on which to challenge the legitimacy of the Ottoman government during 
both famines. They were effective in the majority of famine localities; but their role 
became more crucial in places where the Ottoman government intervened late, or 
where governors applied coercive taxation policies and policing, such as Mutasarrıf 
[District Governor] İbrahim Kamil Pasha in Erzurum during the second famine.40
37 Levant Herald, 23 Apr. 1874 (in The Famine in Asia Minor, 1989, 8). 
38 Edgerton-Tarpley, 2013, 140.
39 Newby, 2014, 72–3. 
40 Ertem, 2012, 232–40. 
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Regarding the latter realm (the economic dimensions of the crisis), the Crimean 
War had already born significant consequences for Ottoman fiscality. It started 
the long-term borrowing of the Ottoman governments from European markets 
and creditors in 1856, and caused a quasi-dependence of the Ottoman state on 
European financial sources for several decades. In his work on the Ottoman budgets 
during Abdülhamid II’s rule, Engin Akarli states: “Money, the reformers did find. They 
borrowed it liberally from wealthy West European countries for the principal purpose 
of covering budget deficits”, adding, “but not to improve the productive capacity of 
the country. Thus, they put a burden on future generations without bequeathing 
equivalent benefits.”41 Yet, as Akarli, Deringil and several other Ottoman historians 
also cautioned, this story of dependence has been imagined far too easily within 
an “Ottoman decline” paradigm for decades in Ottoman historiography.42 Several 
groups of Ottoman reformist statesmen constantly negotiated the terms of the 
Ottoman state despite prevailing domestic and international challenges, and unlike 
the dependent conditions that many of their counterparts in colonized India and 
Africa had to face, they “were nonetheless able to carve out a critical space for 
manouevre” within the international scene.43 They were also acutely aware of the 
political, financial, and infrastructural problems the empire faced, and especially 
during the years of Abdülhamid II’s reign, they attached special importance to raising 
agricultural production, social welfare policies, and infrastructural development.44 
Isa Blumi, developing solid arguments of modernization narratives in late-nineteenth 
century Ottoman historiography, writes: “To some crucial outside interests,  the 
Ottoman capacity to produce wealth proved both a long-term threat to their own 
expansionist aims and at the same time an attractive source of potential revenues if 
properly harnessed.”45 Thus, in contrast to  accounts interpreting Ottoman imperial 
collapse as a product  of a premodern, backward, “oriental” social order and violent 
sectarian rivalry, he focuses on the “emergent Euro-American financial oligarchy,” 
and “private banks that were extensions of vast family networks” as critical forces 
shaping the terms on which “Ottoman demise” took place.46Their role is crucial for 
understanding the imperial challenges of 1870s. 
41 Akarlı, 1992, 443. 
42 For a critical analysis of declinist and Eurocentric tendencies in Ottoman historiography, see 
Faroqhi, 2010. 
43 Deringil, 1999, 3. 
44 Akarlı, 1992, 443; see also Akarlı, 2010.Nevertheless, the “public good” was not necessarily 
the priority; they deemed these necessary in order to survive in both domestic and international 
arenas. For the relationship between power, legitimacy and welfare, Özbek, 2005.Their projects and 
solutions did not prevent / exclude the accelerating violence, the loss of legitimacy, and the eventual 
deposition of Abdülhamid II by the Young Turks in 1908.
45 Blumi, 2013, 19. 
46 Blumi, 2013, 19: “In other words, Ottoman collapse was contingent on a number of factors that 
as much reflect a variety of indigenous actors’ interests informed by local processes as those of the 
banking houses in Paris, London, Frankfurt, Vienna, and Milan.” 
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British India experienced similar developments within a colonial context. While 
comparing British and Ottoman Empires, Christopher Bayly suggests that they had 
parallel trajectories of “distorted development”, albeit for varying reasons. He explains 
the concept in relation to British India thus: “…the British government did “develop” 
India through infrastructural and social investment, but only to limited degree 
and only to an extent that was compatible with British strategic and commercial 
aims”.47 He found a parallel for this “distorted development” in the reform attempts 
of the Tanzimat and the Hamidian eras. He claimed that these attempts, which 
“were driven by a desire to save the dynasty,” were constrained by two factors. 
The first one  was “the external regimes of free trade, capitulations, and Ottoman 
debt repayments.” Bayly suggests the system created by these constraints was 
“remarkably similar in its outlines to the more direct imperial economic pressures 
that were felt in India.”48 He notes that the difference between British India and the 
Ottoman Empire lay in that fact that European resident commercial interests did not 
have a direct effect on government policy in the Ottoman Empire. However, their 
similarity was more striking: “During the age of capitalist imperialism after 1860 it is 
noteworthy that the drain of ‘home charges’ and debt repayments on the Ottoman 
and Indian exchequers amounted to about the same, 2.5 percent per annum.”49
The second constraint that laid the ground for a ‘distorted modernization’ was the 
“internal social structure” based on the use of intermediary groups such as “tribal” 
headships and religious millet [the system of religious communities—Muslims, 
Christians, Jews—having legal identities] divisions as a tool of local government 
and cooption. According to Bayly, “old religious, millet and tribal distinctions 
remained lines of fracture that could widen in the case of external enticement and 
local opportunism.”50
The famines did indeed strike the empire during such a period of compounded 
vulnerabilities. In the Balkans, the Serbs had gained autonomy and the Greeks had 
become independent. Egypt also gained wider autonomy from the Ottoman state in 
1873. There was civil strife in Herzegovina between 1874 and 1876, and intellectual 
groups such as the Young Ottomans, who stood for Ottoman patriotism and liberal 
constitutionalism, were gaining influence and would contribute to the deposition  of 
Sultan Abdülaziz in 1876.51
Throughout these years, besides military spending, further borrowing increased 
at ever higher interest rates in order to manage the existing debt. The “Great 
Depression” of 1873 in Europe and the United States triggered a world financial 
47 Bayly, 2007, 339.
48 Bayly, 2007, 339.Richard Horowitz develops similar arguments while comparing China, Siam and 
the Ottoman Empire. He writes, international law based on diplomacy and free trade agreements in 
the nineteenth century was an agent in the transformation of these states as “semi-colonial political 
systems.” Horowitz, 2004, 446–7.
49 Bayly, 2007, 339.
50 Bayly, 2007, 340. 
51 Somel, 2003, Ix–Ixi. 
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crisis that put Ottoman state finances in great trouble because of the difficulty 
of obtaining new credit and capital flight.52 The government managed to sign a 
new contract for loans in October 1874, an act, which prompted the following 
commentary on the pages of the Chicago Daily Tribune: 
[…] it may be doubted whether this loan, or indeed any financial measure will materially 
improve the desperate condition of the Turkish finances. Her national debt amounts 
to more than 700,000,000 dollars, the interest on which is 50,000,000 dollars or more 
than half of her last year’s revenue…In view of the famine in Asia Minor and other 
districts, the really collectable taxes will hardly be increased by one-fourth the amount 
anticipated.53
When the Ottoman government declared partial insolvency in 1875, inhabitants 
were still struggling with the severe consequences of the famine disaster in central 
Anatolia. Not long after, another drought followed by a harsh winter in 1879 hit this 
time eastern provinces, and aggravated the devastation caused by the Russo-
Ottoman War of 1877–78 in the region, especially in Erzurum, Van, and Diyarbekir. 
In 1880, just like in 1874, grain prices increased, bread was inadequate, peasants 
had to migrate to towns, and many lives were lost.54 The war  had already  made the 
lives of populations in north-eastern and eastern provinces miserable, especially in 
Erzurum, a major battlefield province. The Ottoman Empire lost much in terms of 
land and manpower. After diplomatic negotiations between the European powers, 
article 16 of the San Stefano Treaty was integrated into the Berlin Treaty (signed 
on 13 July 1878). This clause put pressure on Abdülhamid II and the Ottoman 
government to “carry into effect, without further delay, the improvements and reforms 
demanded by local requirements in the provinces inhabited by the Armenians, 
and to guarantee their security from Kurds and Circassians.”55 The Berlin Treaty 
pointed to the emergence of the politically comparable ‘Armenian’ and ‘Reform’ 
Questions regarding the eastern provinces of the Ottoman Empire. The intensity of 
the political and financial crises increased as the Empire faced three major issues: 
the re-settlement of Circassian and Muslim refugees arriving in these provinces 
from lands lost in the war, the burden of paying war indemnities, and the challenge 
of controlling the plunders committed by the Kurdish tribes especially in villages 
inhabited by Armenian peasants in eastern provinces. These acts intensified with 
the famine. 
52 Pamuk, 1984, 114.  
53 Chicago Daily Tribune, 18 Oct. 1874.
54 Around 10,000 people in the eastern provinces and 25,000 in Mosul died according to 
contemporary records. Prime Ministry Ottoman Archives [BOA], Ministry of Internal Affairs 
Correspondence Registers [DH.MKT], 1331/42, 9 May 1880; Duguid, 1973.
55 Rolin-Jaequemyns, 1891, 34. 
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An Overshadowed Memory: War and Famine
When famine hit the Ottoman east in 1880, it marked the beginning of a new 
configuration of circumstances. Unlike the previous famine in central Anatolia, this 
one closely related to war. The resultant loss of agricultural produce, as well as the 
scarcity, and high price of bread raised the intensity of violence and plundering in 
the eastern and north-eastern provinces. Conflicts over land and food deepened 
with the arrival of the first Muslim refugees in a period of general scarcity.56 As 
paper currency continued to depreciate, the price of bread increased even further. 
Several imperial decrees were issued to “maintain peace and order” through 
attempted stabilizations of bread prices, the provision of bread rations for the 
poor, and the assigned supervision of bakeries by zaptieh (police) and municipal 
authorities in order to prevent anyone from buying extra amounts of bread.57 The 
bakeries, however, usually refused to distribute free bread to the refugees.58 These 
events alerted the government to the fact that it needed new measures to curtail 
the rising cost of bread. Despite several attempts to relieve the distress, conflict over 
bread and small-scale bread riots (mostly initiated by Muslim refugees) persisted 
in Istanbul.59 Scarcity and the devaluation of currency by order of the Ottoman 
government  triggered discontent in the rest of Anatolian provinces as well. Another 
serious unrest in the Malatya district of Diyarbekir in March 1880 by Muslim and 
non-Muslim inhabitants alarmed the central authorities.60 An imperial fiscal crisis 
could translate into a severe political crisis in a province already struggling with 
famine and scarcity.
On 24 August 1879, Thomas Boyacıyan, Acting British Vice Consul in Diyarbekir, 
reported the first signs of famine:
The price of provisions is getting very high, and already the signs of poverty and 
famine are appearing. Hundreds of Arab families are located in the neighborhood of 
Diarbekir [sic]. Farmers are demanding seed for next year, but the Government does 
not care much about it. I pointed out, both to the Vali [Provincial Governor] and to the 
Commission [Local administration] the other day, the danger of neglecting an affair like 
this. They promised to consider the matter.61
56 Terzibaşoğlu, 2004, 102; Chochiev &Koç, 2006. See also Blumi, 2013, 43–66.  
57 BOA I-DH [Imperial Decrees of Internal Affairs] 783/63655–17, 17 Mar. 1879; BOA.Y.PRK. ŞH 
[Yıldız Palace, Municipality Documents]1–12, 23 Mar. 1879; BOA. Y.PRK.ŞH 1–14, 17 Apr. 1879; 
BOA. Y. PRK. ŞH 1–15, 22 Apr. 1879.
58 In the Beşiktaş neighbourhood of Istanbul, the bakeries refused to supply the refugees with free 
bread despite the coupons allocated to these refugees by the government. BOA. Y.PRK. ŞH 1–19, 
29 June 1879. 
59 For example, almost a year later, in the Çemberlitaş area of the capital city, refugees attempted 
to plunder a bakery. BOA. Y.PRK.ŞH 1–30, 11 Mar. 1880. 
60 Stephen Duguid was the first to mention this unrest, referring to foreign accounts of these events 
in his unpublished thesis from 1970. According to Duguid, it was “one of the few instances of civil 
protest during this period.” Duguid, 1970, 145.
61 Acting Vice-Consul Boyajian to Major Trotter, Diarbekir, 24 Aug. 1879, FO [British Foreign 
Office] 424–91, 4.
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Villages and towns on the Erzurum Plateau and in the area of Diyarbekir, 
provinces which had been ordered to provide relief to famine-stricken districts a 
couple of years earlier, were themselves hit by famine and scarcity in 1879–81. 
Messrs. Dewey and Thom, Protestant American missionaries stationed at Mardin, 
reported that the famine extended from Diyarbekir to the Persian Gulf.62 The scanty 
rainfall during the winter of 1878–79 resulted in the loss of summer crops and a rapid 
rise of prices. As it had occurred a couple of years earlier, the region experienced 
“[…] a winter of almost unexampled severity from cold and snow, so that not only 
did food and fuel rapidly vanish, but thousands of cattle and sheep perished […].”63 
In the countryside, the loss of cattle and other means of subsistence triggered 
increased plundering  by starving Kurdish nomadic tribes in frontier villages mainly 
composed of sedentary Armenian, Kurdish, Turkish, Syriac and Arab communities.
In urban areas, scarcity and high prices aggravated pre-existing economic 
hardships. In Diyarbekir, in June 1880, a bread riot directed at  two local council 
members, one of them a Catholic Armenian grain merchant, the other a Muslim 
notable, took place. The crowd, including many women and children, according 
to contemporary sources, was also composed of both Muslim and non-Muslim 
inhabitants (including Armenians and Turks).64 Economic problems cut across 
religious-ethnic lines, and when merged with famine, the former were expressed 
as communal conflicts as well as united actions against political and economic 
authorities by poor and deprived inhabitants. The problems in Diyarbekir, and 
news of violence against Armenian villages in the district of Van posed serious 
threats to political legitimacy and the heritage of the Tanzimat reforms in the first 
years of Abdülhamid II’s reign. Before it could address the financial crisis and 
the aftermath of war, the new Ottoman government  had to cope with famine.65 
While the legitimacy of the Ottoman state was being strongly undermined in the 
eastern provinces during the famine, its financial independence was also on the 
wane. In 1881, the Public Debt Commission (Düyun-u Umumiye), consisting of the 
representatives of Ottoman bondholders, was established in Istanbul. The duty 
of the commission was to administer and collect most of the taxes and revenues 
that would repay the foreign debt, as well as the recently added war indemnity to 
Russia.66 With the establishment of this institution, the Ottoman government placed 
about one third of its revenue under the control of foreign creditors, thus rendering 
it more vulnerable to the interventions of foreign powers. These developments in 
62 Kazemi, 2016.
63 Anon. “The Distress in Turkey” in Missionary Herald, Jun. 1880, 76:6, 211.
64 Ertem, 2010.
65 In order to fight the famine in the eastern provinces, an Ottoman Famine Commission was 
established in Istanbul in the last week of April 1880. BOA. I–DH 802–65028, 8 April 1880. It had 
two main duties: (1) to procure grain from neighboring provinces, either as gratuitous relief, or to 
purchase and transport it to famine-stricken provinces; (2) to encourage the organization of public 
and private charity through diverse campaigns and newspaper announcements in Istanbul.
66 Shaw & Shaw, 1995, 224. 
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the 1870s and the early 1880s forced the Ottoman administrators to re-evaluate 
the limits of Tanzimat reforms in the region, and search alternative methods of 
integration and order for these provinces.
• • •
Abdülhamid II managed to consolidate his modern autocratic rule in the empire 
throughout the 1880s and 1890s and several Kurdish tribes became his prominent 
political and economic allies  in maintaining “security” and “order” in the Anatolian 
countryside.67 After the Armenian massacres of the 1890s in the eastern provinces 
of the empire,68 memories of the latest famine became subsumed under this 
new heavy trauma much in the same way memories of the previous famine had 
dissolved into the trauma of the Russo-Ottoman War of 1877-78, and the hunger 
experience during the First World War. The Russo-Ottoman War (1877–78) erupted 
only a few years after the great central Anatolian famine. Thus, the intensity of war 
suffering overcame the painful memories of the previous famine period (1873–75). 
The famine that struck eastern provinces in the aftermath of the Russo-Ottoman 
War, on the other hand, was overshadowed by the emergence of the “Armenian 
Question” as an international political issue. The mainstream historiography of the 
Ottoman east has ignored the famine that killed at least 10,000 people in 1879–81 
for two main reasons: 1) the number of the deceased was not deemed significant to 
be analyzed separately; 2) the violent bloodshed during the Armenian massacres 
of 1895–96 and 1915 was a more powerful upheaval. It has dominated memory 
and historiography of the Ottoman east during the Ottoman era.69
In her excellent book on the cultural history of the Great Chinese famine [Dingwu 
qihuang, 1876–79], Kathryn Edgerton-Tarpley stated that “few Chinese people 
outside the scholarly community have even heard the term Dingwu qihuang.”70 She 
explained why: 
Both local and national discussions of the disaster were … rapidly buried under layer 
upon layer of new upheavals – China’s loss to Japan in the 1895 Sino-Japanese War, 
the invasion by eight allied armies after the Boxer Rebellion, the 1911 Revolution, the 
May 4th Movement, the Japanese invasion of Manchuria and then of China proper, civil 
war between the Communists and the Nationalists, and the Communist Revolution. 
Nineteenth- and twentieth-century Chinese history was marked by one enormous 
disaster after another, and the horror of mass starvation was repeatedly ignored in 
favor of focusing on disasters with clearer-cut heroes and villains.71
67 Klein, 2011.
68 Maksudyan, 2014. 
69 The latest volume on the Ottoman East is a significant contribution to the historiography of 
Ottoman Anatolia, that goes beyond conventional paradigms and building on the previous literature, 
takes into account the perspectives of the locals. Sipahi, Derderian & Cora, 2016. 
70 Edgerton-Tarpley, 2008, 5.
71 Edgerton-Tarpley, 2008, 5. 
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The Ottoman famine history and historiography had similar problems. Hunger 
accounts in 1870s soon mixed with the succeeding traumas in Ottoman Anatolia 
and became ordinary details within stories of violence, bloodshed and misery in 
1890s. The daily struggles, pains, clashes, hopes, and frustrations of ordinary 
children, women, men, and already quiet  stories of starved animals in the region 
were silenced under the weight of ensuing wars, massacres, political, religious, 
ethnic upheavals in collective memory.
The trauma of famine was one which affected numerous regions and peoples 
during the nineteenth century, including Ireland, British India, China, Brazil, 
Iran, Europe, and Russia. Global, imperial, and colonial economic relations, 
consequent financial straits, repercussions of modern statehood, taxation policies, 
impoverishment, infrastructural problems, domestic political chaos, wars, violence, 
corruption, and political recklessness all compounded the devastating impact of 
climate and natural disasters. States and private actors took certain relief measures 
and actions, and international humanitarian agents developed relief missions and 
initiatives. However, millions of people still died of hunger and disease unnoticed 
in places whose rulers had been relying extensively upon discourses of science, 
physical and moral superiority, and modernization. Disease due to hunger, 
immigration, rising bread prices, grain hoarding, riots, theft, plunder, violence, moral 
corruption, transformation of values, dissolving of family and community bonds 
became widespread phenomena in the very same century of prevalent reform, 
progress, centralization, state power and development discourses. Starving men, 
women, and children could not make their true agony be heard.Notwithstanding 
their individual contexts, stories, and differences, the Ottoman famines were at the 
same time part of this broader history. The ordinary Ottomans had their share from 
nineteenth-century hunger(s) with all pecularities intact. Its memory might have 
remained dim; but it is not non-existent. 
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